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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Article VIII § 5 of
the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) and (4), Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)3(2)(j), and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appeal is taken from the
granting of a motion for summary judgment by the District Court, which was then appealed
to the Utah Supreme Court. The case was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the
Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1) Did the district court err in granting summary judgment for ZZXYZ on the
ground that Neil Hone failed to present evidence as to the cause of the fall and that further
investigation would not reveal the cause of the fall, and therefore, causation could not be
proven?
2) Can the granting of summary judgment for ZZXYZ be upheld on the alternative
ground that Neil Hone has failed to provide sufficient evidence to create a question of
material fact regarding breach of duty to prevent a granting of summary judgment on that
ground?
The proper standard of review on both of these issues is a review for correctness.
An appeal from a summary judgement only addresses two questions: "whether the lower
court erred in (1) applying the governing law, and (2) holding that no material facts were in
dispute." Nelson, by and through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah
1996) (quoting Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746,749 (1983)). Thus, the
1

trial court's order of dismissal is reviewed for correctness. Id. (quoting St. Benedict's Dev.
Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)). Also, "because negligence
cases often require the drawing of inferences from the facts, which is properly done by
juries rather than judges 'summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the
clearest of instances.'" Id. (citing Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewlers, 811 P.2d 182,183 (Utah
1991)).
Both issues were preserved on appeal by being raised before the trial court. ZZXYZ
argued in their original Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff Neil D. Hone's Claims that Mr. Hone had failed to show that any alleged rocks
were the proximate and actual cause of his injuries. (Chevy's Memorandum In Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, pages 7-13; R. 135-141). This issue was further argued by
ZZXYZ in Chevy's Reply In Further Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff Neil D. Hone's Claims. (Chevy's Reply In Further Support of Its Motion for
Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Neil D. Hone's Claims, pages 2-6; R. 235-240).
Also in their original Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiff Neil D. Hone's Claims, ZZXYZ argued that the Hones had failed to make a prima
facie case for negligence because the Hones had not supplied evidence as to the length of
time the dangerous condition had existed, in order to show constructive knowledge on the
part of ZZXYZ. (Chevy's Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
pages 13-14; R. 134-135). The issue of breach was argued extensively at the first oral
arguement, and was the main focus of the supplemental proceeding hearing on the summary
2

judgment motion. (Transcript of the supplemental proceeding is attached as Exhibit 1 of
the Addendum.) The issue was briefed in the Supplemental Memorandum In Support of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pages 3 and 4 (R. 276-277) filed by ZZXYZ;
and the Supplemental Memorandum In Response to Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pages 4 and 5 (R. 325-326).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is essentially a "slip and fall" case involving Mr. Neil Hone and ZZXYZ
Management Group d.b.a. Chevy's Fresh Mex. Mr. Hone alleges that ZZXYZ's negligent
maintenance of its landscaping and sidewalk resulted in Mr. Hone slipping and falling on
rocks located on ZZXYZ's sidewalk. The trial court granted summary judgment on the
ground that Mr. Hone had failed to provide any evidence that would show that any rocks
which might have been on ZZXYZ's sidewalk were the proximate cause of Mr. Hone's fall.
(R. 340). Mr. Hone appealed to the Utah Supreme Court who transferred the case to this
Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
For the purposes of reviewing the granting of summary judgment by the trial court,
ZZXYZ does not dispute the majority of the description of the facts provided by the Hones
in their brief. ZZXYZ does not stipulate to these facts, but instead acknowledges that for
the purposes of summary judgment all questions of fact are to be viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.
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Specifically, only for the purposes of summary judgment does ZZXYZ assume that
there were rocks on the sidewalk at the time of Mr. Hone's fall. At trial, ZZXYZ would
contend that there were not any rocks on the sidewalk, as stated by Sarah Howard in her
deposition. (Sarah Howard's Deposition, page 14, line 2 to page 15, line 20; R. 119).
ZZXYZ does not agree with the Hones' characterization of Mr. Ryan McMillan's
deposition testimony to the extent that it might suggest that Mr. McMillan states that he did
not conduct an examination of the sidewalk at the beginning of his shift on the day in
question. Mr. McMillan was specifically asked whether he recalled policing the area
outside on the day in question, to which he responded "[t]hat morning I don't recall." (Ryan
McMillan's Deposition, page 12 lines 12-16; R. 110). This testimony at best simply shows
that Mr. McMillan cannot remember whether or not he policed the outside area on that
particular day, and does not support a contention or an inference that the policing was not
done.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Summary judgment was appropriate because the Hones did not provide evidence
with respect to the proximate cause of Neil's fall. The Hones only evidence is that Neil
thought he slipped on something, that Paula thought it looked like he stumbled, and Paula
and Dustin claim to have seen rocks in the vicinity. These statements are insufficient
evidence to allow a fact finder to make reasonable inferences that Neil stepped on a rock
and that the rock came from the rock landscaping. Any such findings would have to be the
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result of speculation because there is no direct evidence to support a finding that Neil in
fact stepped on a rock or that the rock would have come from the landscaping.
The Hones also did not supply evidence to support a finding that ZZXYZ breached a
duty of care to Neil. With respect to a theory involving a method of operation, a
landscaping choice is not a method of operation of the business. Landscaping should not be
considered the way in which a business is operated. Even if landscaping were considered to
be a method of operation, removal of rocks from landscaping is not an expected act within
the theory. Accordingly, any danger presented by rocks from the landscaping being on the
sidewalk do not fall within the category of a reasonably foreseeable inherent danger. With
respect to the landscaping being a permanent structure causing temporary hazards, there is
no evidence which would support a finding that absent some unexpected act, the rocks from
the landscaping would move to the sidewalk. Only the intervention of a third-party could
move the rocks to the sidewalk.
Accordingly, any rocks which were allegedly on the sidewalk should properly be
treated as a temporary condition. This requires that the Hones supply evidence to show that
ZZXYZ either knew or should have known of the rocks presence. The Hones have not
shown that ZZXYZ had actual knowledge of the rocks, nor have the Hones supplied any
evidence with respect to the length of time the rocks were on the sidewalk. The Hones have
tried to claim that ZZXYZ's manager on duty at the time failed to make a required
inspection. However, the only testimony on this point is that the manager does not
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remember whether or not he made the inspection that day. Accordingly, it would only be a
matter of speculation by the fact finder as to whether the inspection was made.
ARGUMENT
I.

Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Because the Hones Did Not Provide
Evidence Showing That the Alleged Rocks Were the Proximate Cause of
Neil's Fall
The trial court ruled that "[n]o evidence has been presented that the rocks were the

cause of the fall, simply a 'bare contention' made that they could be the cause."
(Memorandum Decision of Trial Court, Appellant's Brief Exhibit "J"; R.342). The trial
court further concluded that "further investigation will not reveal the cause of the fall and
thus the claim fails as a matter of law." (Id.; R. 342). The trial court did find that there was
a material issue of fact with respect to whether or not Chevy's knew or should have known
that the rocks were on the sidewalk and an unsafe condition existed. (Memorandum
Decision; R. 341). A review of the record indicates that there is no evidence that would
support a finding that Chevy's breached a duty of care to Neil.
A.

The Hones Have Not Presented Any Evidence to Show That Any Rocks
Which May Have Been Present Were the Cause of NeiPs Fall.

The trial court correctly held that there was no evidence to show that rocks which
may or may not have been present in the vicinity of Neil's fall were the proximate and
actual cause of Neil's fall and the resulting injuries. Before the trial court, the Hones
presented the following statements by affidavit or deposition testimony. Paula states that
she saw small rocks in the area where Neil fell. (Paula's Deposition, page 15, line 14 to
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page 16, line 8; R. 104-103). Dustin states that while in the area of the accident, apparently
after Neil's fall, he observed what appeared to be pea gravel in the area where Neil fell.
(Dustin's Affidavit, page 2, ^ 9; R. 284). Paula states that she saw Neil fall like 'lie had
stumbled on something." (Paula's Deposition, page 12, lines 2-4; R. 104). Neil himself
stated in his deposition that he remembered his right foot slipping and that it "felt like there
was something ... [under his right foot]". (Neil's Deposition, page 27, lines 6-17; R. 126).
Even if these statements are proven to be true and accurate, all the statements establish is
that Neil slipped and fell in the vicinity of some loose gravel. These statements do not
prove necessary links in the chain of causation such as (1) that Neil actually stepped on
something; (2) that the item that Neil stepped on was a rock; and (3) the rock caused Neil to
slip.
The Hones argue that a jury is entitled to make reasonable inferences from the
evidence presented, and that Utah law allows each of the links in the chain of causation to
be proven by inference. Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 132 P.2d 680, 682 (Utah 1943).
What Utah law does not allow is for fact finders to speculate about issues of causation.
Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996). The
Hones contend that the statements of Neil, Paula, and Dustin are sufficient evidence so that
a finding by a fact finder that the rocks did cause the fall would be a reasonable inference.
The Hones correctly state that "inference" and "speculation" have been specifically
defined. (Hones' Appellant Brief, page 24). An "inference" has been defined in Utah as "a
deduction as to the existence of a fact which human experience teaches us can reasonably
7

and logically be drawn from proof of other facts." State v. Hester. 2000 UT App 159, f 16,
3 P.3d 725 (quoting Manchester v. Dugan. 247 A.2d 827,829 (Me. 1968)). "Speculation"
is defined as the "act or practice of theorizing about matters over which there is no certain
knowledge." Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1407 (7th ed. 1999)). The Court of
Appeals correctly notes that speculation and inference are simply two points on a
continuum between absolute certainty and complete impossibiUty. Id. However, this is not
to say that there are not situations where the difference is readily apparent.
In the instant case, the Hones argue that a jury could reasonably infer the necessary
links in the chain of causation from the Hones allegations that there were rocks on the
ground near the location of Neil's fall, that Neil's fall looked like he stumbled on
something, and that Neil felt something under his foot. Assuming for the purposes of
argument that Neil did step on something and that there were rocks in the vicinity of Neil's
fall, this evidence would not support reasonable inferences with respect to the necessary
links in causation.

.

,

The first link in the chain of causation is that Neil stepped on something. To support
this, the Hones have provided Neil's statement that he felt something under his foot. It
would appear that a finder of fact could reasonably infer that there was something under his
foot. Human experience could easily tell a fact finder that when it feels like there is
something under your foot there usually is.

<

The second link is that the "something" under Neil's foot was a rock. While the
Hones appear to argue that it is a reasonable inference that if you feel something under
8

(

your foot and there are small rocks nearby, that a fact finder is reasonably entitled to infer
that it was a rock that was under your foot. However, a careful reading of the definition of
inference show that such a finding would be speculation. An inference is a deduction that
human experience teaches can be reasonably and logically drawn from proof of other facts.
The presence of other rocks in the vicinity does not support a logical finding that if
someone steps on something in the vicinity of rocks that it is a rock that the person has
stepped on. It suggests the possibility of it being a rock that was stepped on, but there is no
certain knowledge. Instead, such a finding would fit the definition of speculation as
theorizing about matters over which there is no certain knowledge.
The third link is that assuming Neil stepped on a rock, the rock caused Neil to slip.
Assuming for the moment that it was proven that Neil stepped on a rock, it would appear
that a fact finder would be entitled to infer that stepping on the rock caused Neil's foot to
slip resulting in the fall. However, this legitimate inference only serves to show the
difference between an legitimate inference and speculation.
Human experience teaches that if you step on a small rock on concrete the rock can
skid, causing you to slip and possibly fall. Human experience does not teach that if you
step on something and there are rocks nearby, you must have stepped on a rock. All that is
shown is a mere possibility. Under such a theory, attempting to identify the item that was
stepped on by looking at the surrounding area is pure speculation. It is equally possible that
Neil stepped on a mint dropped by a patron leaving the restaurant, or that Neil stepped on a
marble dropped by a child. While the Hones would undoubtably respond that there is no
9

evidence of a mint, a marble, or any other item on the sidewalk; there is no evidence that
there was a rock underneath Neil's foot. Proximity does not equal probability.
B.

The Trial Court Was Not Required to Weigh the Evidence to Grant
Summary Judgment Because the Hones Did Not Provide Evidence With
Respect to Causation.

The Hones argue that because Paula concluded that the rocks were the cause of
Neil's fall, the only way that the trial court could have granted summary judgment was to
find that this "evidence" was disregarded or deemed not credible. (Hones' Appellant Brief,
page 38). The Hones beheve that this statement constitutes a fact which when taken in the
light most favorable to the Hones should preclude summary judgment. However, the trial
court correctly identified this statement as a 'bare contention' as to the cause of Neil's fall.
Paula's belief is based on her observations that her husband appeared to stumble and that
after his fall she saw rocks nearby. (Paula's Deposition, page 15, lines 14-18; R. 106).
Paula has no direct knowledge of what caused Neil's fall. Accordingly, there was no
"evidence" for the trial court to weigh. Paula's belief is not evidence, only her direct
observations. Paula is not entitled to make inferences or speculate and then have such
inferences or speculation treated as fact.
C

The Case Law Cited by the Hones Does Not Support the Hones
Contention of Sufficient Evidence to Support Reasonable Inferences,

The Hones have cited a number of cases which they claim support their proposition
that they have provided sufficient evidence on which a finder of fact could reasonably infer
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the necessary links in the chain of causation. However, a careful review of these cases
shows that the cases do not support the Hones contention.
The Hones cite the case of Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) for the proposition that inferential evidence can be obtained primarily from a
witness, and that the evidence does not have to be observed prior to the accident. (Hones'
Appellant Brief, page 25). In that case, after observing the fall of her friend, the witness
went to help her friend up and discovered the floor was wet. Silcox at 624. Neither the
plaintiff nor the witness had noticed that the floor was wet prior to the fall. Id. After the
plaintiff had been removed from the area, the friend noticed that there were spots of water
leading from the wet area where the plaintiff fell to a cart used to transport stock items,
which was loaded with bags of melting ice, located approximately 115 feet away. Id. The
Court of Appeals held that u[a]n inference could readily be drawn by the jury that the water
in which plaintiff fell came from the bags of ice on the cart left in the aisle by store
employees." Id. at 624-25.
Silcox is factually distinguishable from the instant case. In Silcox, it was not
contested that the water on the floor caused the plaintiffs fall. Silcox was before the Court
of Appeals on the question of whether or not the store's employees caused the dangerous
condition, which would avoid the need to prove notice to the store. Id. at 624. The
inferences that a fact finder would have been entitled to reasonably make were with respect
to how the water got onto the floor of the dry goods aisle. The witness noticed that the
floor was wet where the plaintiff fell. The witness observed puddles of water leading from
11

the wet spot to the cart 115 feet away. The witness observed that the cart was loaded with
bags of melting ice. Observations made after a fall in this situation could support
reasonable inferences as to how the water got onto the floor. The Court of Appeals did not
examine the issue of whether such observations would entitle the plaintiff to an inference
that the water had caused the plaintiffs fall.
The Hones again cite to the case of Nelson By and Through Stuckman, supra, this
time for the proposition that the existence of alternative theories of causation does not
preclude presenting evidence to the jury and also provides a model for acceptable
inferences. (Hones' Appellant Brief, page 27). Nelson involves a four year-old boy who
wandered out of a park and into the Jordan River where he was injured. The boy's mother
sued Salt Lake City and the State of Utah for failure to repair a breach in the fence,
claiming that the boy must have reached the river through the breach in the fence.
Defendants claimed that the boy could have climbed the four-foot fence or gained access
through some other means. The facts of the case indicate there were no witnesses who saw
the boy pass through the breach in the fence. The case was decided by the trial court by
finding that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act precluded liability, that in the absence of
the Act, the Jordan River is a natural waterway for which the City is not responsible, that the
Landowner Liability Act required ''willful" or "malicious" action, and that the claims did not
come within the time limitations prescribed by the Governmental Immunity Act. Id. at 571.
The Court never made any factual conclusions with respect to how the boy reached the
river. Id. at 574.
12

The Court does state that "[although there no witnesses, other evidence may be
sufficient for a jury to find that it was 'more likely than not' that Nelson entered through
the breach in the fence." Id. at 574. The Hones characterize this statement by the Supreme
Court as the Court having "decided that even though the boy could have climbed the fourfoot fence or gained access to the river by some other opening there was enough 'other
evidence5 that a jury could reasonably conclude that more likely than not the boy entered
the river through the breach." (Hones' Appellant Brief, page 28). The statement in the
Hones' Brief is an incorrect reading of the Court's decision. The Court stated that "other
evidence may be sufficient [to support a jury finding] that it was 'more likely than not' that
Nelson entered through the breach in the fence." Id. at 574. (Emphasis added). This does
not mean that the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support an inference,
rather the Court simply recognized that a lack of witnesses does not automatically preclude
submitting the issue to a fact finder provided there is "other evidence" which was sufficient
to support a reasonable inference. This is particularly true where the trial court's decision
was not based on the elements of a negligence claim, but rather on grounds of immunity and
the claims being time barred.
In the instant matter, there are no witnesses with respect to what, if anything, Neil
stepped on. While the Nelson decision would allow a jury to rely on "other evidence"
which would support a reasonable inference that Neil stepped on a rock, the Hones have not
been able to provide any such evidence. The fact that there were rocks nearby will not
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support a reasonable inference, only speculation. Paula's statement that she believed the
rocks caused the fall is based on her own speculation and is likewise not "other evidence".
The Hones have not provided any "other evidence" to support an inference that a
rock caused Neil's fall. Accordingly, as the Nelson court stated, "[a] mere possibility of
such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation or
conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court
to direct a verdict for the defendant." Nelson at 574 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al.,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41, at 265 (5th ed. 1984), quoted in Weber v.
Springville Citv, 725 P.2d 1360,1367 (Utah 1986)).
The Hones next case is Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 388 P.2d 409 (Utah 1964)
for the proposition that it is a reasonable inference if a jury could "conclude that there was
a greater possibility that the canned goods box was left in the aisle by an employee rather
than a customer." (Hones'Appellant Brief, page 28). In Campbell, the plaintiff at a
grocery store tripped over an empty cardboard box. Id. at 409. There was no question as to
what caused the fall, instead the case turned on how the box in question came to be on the
floor of the aisle where the plaintiff tripped. The Court found that as the result of a number
of facts regarding the box itself and the customary usage of boxes in the store that a jury
could reasonably conclude that there was "a greater probability that store employees left
the box where it was than that a customer or stranger did." Id. at 411. It should be noted
that while the Campbell Court talked about "greater probability," the Hones would cite the
rule as "greater possibility." (Emphasis added).
14

Among the facts which the Campbell Court found would support a jury's finding
were that the box was of a type that some of the canned goods sold at the store came in
which the clerks then stock on the shelves; that it would be unusual for a customer to be
using a cardboard box in the merchandise area; especially given the small size of the box;
that customers usually use shopping carts as opposed to boxes in doing their shopping; that
the checkers usually place purchased items in large sacks although in some instances
boxes; and that if boxes are used by the checkers they are usually larger than the box in this
case. Id. at 410.
In Campbell, the jury was attempting to determine how the box came to be in the
aisle of the store. The jury was not trying to determine what had caused the plaintiff to fall.
This is very different from the current matter where the Hones are not asking a fact finder
to infer how an item came to be on the sidewalk, but are rather asking the jury to infer the
existence of an item; then infer the identity of this item whose existence has been inferred;
and then infer the source of this item, whose identity and existence are based on inference.
The Hones cannot simply cite the Campbell decision for the proposition that a proper
inference is any where a jury could reasonably conclude that there was a greater possibility
that a store employee left the box and from there try to say that any possibility that is
greater than the others presented is a reasonable inference.
While not explicit in the Campbell case, a careful reading supports the idea that the
Court was really advancing a "more likely than not standard". In other words, the Court was
saying that it was more likely that a store employee left the box on the floor than the
15

combined likelihood that the box arrived on the floor from any other source. This idea is
supported by the Court's use of the "customer or stranger" language. By grouping
"customer" and "stranger" together the Court was saying that in comparing the probability
that an employee had left the box as opposed to the combined probability of a customer or
some other person having left the box, a jury could reasonably believe that the probability
of an employee having left the box was greater than the combined probabiUty of a customer
or stranger.
Under a proper reading of the Campbell case, the Hones argument would have to be
that based on the "evidence" presented, that it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude
that it was more likely that Neil stepped on a rock than the combined likelihood of Neil
having stepped on any other item. There is no evidence to support such a finding by a fact
finder. The only evidence provided is that Neil apparently slipped on something and after
the fall, rocks were seen nearby. Any attempt to say that it was in fact a rock that Neil
stepped on is pure speculation. And even if it is more likely that it was a rock, under the
Hones' theory of a permanent condition, it would also have to be shown that the rock came
from the landscaping. In this case, no one knows what, if anything, Neil slipped on and
there is no way to connect this speculative item with Chevy's.
The Campbell Court compared their case with the case of Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel
Co., 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955), which is also cited by the Hones as a benchmark for
speculation. (Hones Brief at 29). In Lindsay, the plaintiff slipped in a puddle of water on
the floor of a restaurant. Id. at 478. However, the plaintiff did not provide any evidence as
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to how the water had arrived on the floor or how long it had been there. Id. Under these
circumstances, the Court held that "a jury cannot be permitted to speculate that the
defendant was negligent." Id.
This Lindsay decision is based on facts which are actually better for a plaintiff than
the current situation. In Lindsay, the cause of the accident was known, it was the puddle of
water. However, absent evidence that would link the puddle of water to either actions of the
restaurant's employees or evidence that the water had been there for a sufficient period of
time so that the restaurant knew or should have known of the water's presence, it was
improper to allow a jury to speculate. Id. at 478. The Hones have not yet been able to show
what the item which caused Neil's fall was, let alone that ZZXYZ is liable for the item's
presence. Even if it would be proper to infer that Neil did slip on a rock, there is nothing to
connect this rock to ZZXYZ's rock landscaping. The "inferred" rock would be featureless,
much like the water in Lindsay, without any of the specific facts present in the Campbell
case which linked the box to the store and its employees. The Hones have couched their
claim under a theory of a permanent dangerous condition in the rock landscaping.
Accordingly, they must show that the "inferred" rock that caused Neil's fall came from the
landscaping. There is nothing which would connect a rock whose presence is inferred to
the rock landscaping in question.
The Hones also cite to the case of Dvbowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) for a reference point with respect to speculation. In Dvbowski, the
plaintiff slipped and fell as she entered a mall. Id. at 445. The plaintiff did not know what
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caused her to fall and the plaintiff was unaware of any condition on the floor that might have
caused her to fall. Id. at 447. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had failed to raise
any material issue of fact beyond a "bare contention" that the defendant was somehow
negligent and accordingly summary judgment was proper. Id.
The Hones case would appear to fall somewhere between the Dvbowski decision and
the Lindsay decision on the "continuum" of speculation and inference. In Dvbowski, there
was absolutely no evidence provided which would show that the defendant was in any way
negligent. In Lindsay, while there was water on the floor which caused the plaintiffs fall,
there was no evidence to explain how the water got onto the floor and if the defendant was
responsible for the water being on the floor or if the defendant had sufficient time to
become aware of the water. In the case before this Court, for the purposes of summary
judgment it is assumed that there were rocks on the sidewalk. However, the Hones have not
provided evidence that these rocks caused Neil's fall or that the rocks themselves either
came from the landscaping or that the rocks had been on the sidewalk for long enough that
ZZXYZ should have known of the rock's presence. Since the factual situation in this case
is effectively "bracketed" by two cases where Utah courts have found that any findings
would have to be based on speculation, any findings in the instant matter would also have to
be speculative.
Finally, the Hones refer again to the Sumsion decision as a reference to when
evidence is speculative. In Sumsion, the plaintiff claimed that the tow-truck driver towing
the plaintiffs vehicle failed to signal with his arm before entering the flow of traffic. Id. at
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682. The plaintiffs vehicle was struck by another vehicle as it was towed into traffic. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court held that while there was sufficient evidence to go to a jury with
respect to whether the driver failed to signal based on the witness testimony of the plaintiff
and his wife who were riding in the tow-truck at the time, the "evidence relating to the issue
of proximate cause is ... very meager." Id. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial court
correctly held that the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case for recovery in
negligence. Id. at 683.
The Hones claim that the instant case is distinguishable from Sumsion. In Sumsion,,
the Court noted that while the only witness "may have noticed what caused [the vehicle
which struck the plaintiffs vehicle to] start to skid ... [the witness] was not questioned on
[this] point." Id. at 682. The Hones characterize this statement as "the witness was never
questioned as to what he thought the cause of the skid was[.]" (Hones' Appellant Brief,
page 31). Later, the Hones rely on their characterization of the Court's statement that the
witness was not asked what he thought caused the accident to support their contention that
Paula's belief that the rocks caused Neil's fall is substantial evidence of causation. (Hones'
Appellant Brief, page 38).
This argument misinterprets the Court's statement and misapplies the correct rule.
The Court's statement is that the witness "may have noticed what caused [the skid]."
Sumsion at 682. The Court's statement is referring to direct observation by the witness,
not a belief based on speculation. The Court's statement is also clarified by an example the
Court gave with respect to proper inferences based on observations. The Court stated that
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"where a car, apparently turning too sharply, skids, a witness may conclude that the skidding
was caused by the sharp turning. However, if it is later shown that the brakes on one wheel
had locked, the natural inference that the turning caused the skidding may be upset." Id.
In other words, the Court recognized that if a witness could be asked if they saw
something which the witness believes caused the skid, for example a sharp turn, or in the
case of a slip and fall, that the person stepped on a rock. The Hones claim that Paula's
statement should be given the same weight because her belief is also based on her
observations. However, Paula did not see what Neil stepped on. She noticed that he
seemed to stumble, and after the fall she saw some rocks nearby. Paula did not make the
kinds of direct observations necessary for her belief to be considered evidence. In order
for Paula's testimony to be considered evidence with respect to causation, she would have
had to see Neil actually step on the rock. In that case, she could properly testify that she
believed the rock to be the cause of the fall because she saw Neil step on a rock and then
fall.
II.

Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Because the Hones Failed to Show That
ZZXYZ Breached a Duty of Care to Neil.
Summary Judgment would also have been appropriate and can be affirmed by this

Court on the grounds that the Hones have failed to show that ZZXYZ breached a duty of
care to Neil. Before the trial court, the Hones argued that the breach of duty on the part of
ZZXYZ was that there were rocks in the landscaping near the sidewalk, that some of the
rocks from the landscaping got onto the sidewalk, and that ZZXYZ did not take care of the
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rocks on the sidewalk. ("Exhibit 1" Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion for Summary
Judgment on October 29, 2002, page 24, lines 10 to 15). The Hones further argued that
they do not have to prove how the rocks were moved from the landscaping to the sidewalk.
("Exhibit 1" Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment on October 29,
2002, page 24, lines 15 to 18). Counsel for the Hones stated that the Hones "have to prove
that there were rocks on the [the sidewalk] and that the [rocks on the sidewalk] was an
unsafe condition at the time Neil Hone fell and let the jury draw their inferences because ...
it is an impossible burden to say precisely how this rock was picked up or those (sic) group
of rocks were picked up and put over on the sidewalk." ("Exhibit 1" Transcript of Oral
Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment On October 29,2002, page 24, lines 18 to
24).
The Hones argument fails to understand the required elements that must be shown to
support a claim of breach of duty. The Hones allege that they are only required to show that
a dangerous condition existed at the time of Neil Hone's fall to prove a breach of duty. The
Hones further allege that ZZXYZ created this dangerous condition by placing rock
landscaping next to the sidewalk. However, it is not enough to simply say that ZZXYZ
placed rocks near the sidewalk and some of these rocks somehow ended up on the sidewalk,
so ZZXYZ is responsible.
The Hones' argument is exactly the same as the common situation of produce in a
stand in a supermarket, where an individual slips and falls on produce that arguably came
from the stand. The plaintiff in such cases has the duty to either show there was some
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defect in the produce stand itself such that produce would fall by itself to the floor, or that
the produce had been on the floor for sufficient time that the store should have discovered
the condition and remedied the condition. The Hones have not and cannot provide any
evidence as to how long the alleged gravel would have been on the sidewalk, so they must
instead rely on theories involving permanent conditions which do not require notice to the
defendant.
The Hones appear to present two separate theories of permanent hazard on appeal.
First, that ZZXYZ's use of rock landscaping was somehow a method of operation where it
was reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous
condition; and second, that temporary hazards are treated as permanent hazards if they are
caused by a permanent structure. However, permanent condition theories still do not allow
a plaintiff to simply allege that rocks were placed near a sidewalk, that such rocks somehow
got onto the sidewalk which created a dangerous condition at the time of the accident. To
do so would be to hold that anyone who installs gravel landscaping is strictly liable for
anyone who slips and falls on a rock near such landscaping.
A.

ZZXYZ Has Not Chosen a Method of Operation Where It Is Reasonably
Foreseeable That the Expectable Acts of Third Parties Will Create a
Dangerous Condition.

In Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992), the Court of
Appeals held that where a store had adopted a method of operation where it was reasonably
foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition or
defect, the plaintiff does not need to establish notice to the defendant. This is important
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because the Hones have not presented any evidence that the rocks that were allegedly
present would have been there for any length of time sufficient for ZZXYZ to become
aware of the rocks and to have had sufficient time to remove the rocks. It is somewhat
curious that the Hones would now rely on a theory regarding the expectable acts of third
parties, given that the Hones at the trial court argued that, "[w]e have never, ever suggested
that a third person put those rocks there." ("Exhibit 1" Transcript of Oral Argument on
Motion for Summary Judgment on October 29,2002, page 23, lines 24 and 25).
Canfield involved a supermarket that had chosen to use a display of "farmer's pack"
lettuce, in which the store intended customers to remove some of the outer leaves of the
lettuce. Indeed, the store had provided empty boxes around the display in which the
customers could deposit these outer leaves. The Court of Appeals stated that, viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff:
Albertsons chose a method of displaying and offering lettuce fore sale where
it was expected that third parties would remove and discard the outer leaves
from heads of lettuce they intended to purchase. It was reasonably
foreseeable that under this method of operation some leaves would fall or be
dropped on the floor by customers thereby creating a dangerous condition.
Because Albertsons chose this method of operation, the question of whether
Albertsons had notice, either actual or constructive, is not relevant. The
relevant question is whether Albertsons took reasonable precautions to
protect customers against the dangerous condition it created.
The Hones now try to contend that ZZXYZ has chosen a method of operation where it is
reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous
condition.
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The rule outlined in Canfield does not fit the facts in the current situation. First,
ZZXYZ's choice in landscaping cannot be considered to be a method of operation. The
phrase "method of operation" appears to refer to the manner in which an entity conducts its
business. For example, in Canfield, Albertsons expected customers to remove the outer
leaves of the lettuce and had provided means for disposing of those outer leaves. While
there was an intervening actor, the customer, Albertsons not only expected, but encouraged
customers to act the way they did. Accordingly, where Albertsons expected and
encouraged customers to remove outer lettuce leaves and through them into empty boxes it
became reasonably foreseeable that some leaves would end up on the floor, and it became
Albertsons duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent such accidents.
Landscaping is not a method of operation. The landscaping has nothing to do with
the way in which ZZXYZ conducts its business. ZZXYZ does not intend for its customers
to interact with the landscaping. Indeed, the use of large rocks should encourage customers
to avoid the landscaping, since it would be much more difficult than merely walking on the
sidewalk. There has been no suggestion that the landscaping was placed in such a way as to
encourage customers or others to walk through the landscaping as opposed to walking on
the sidewalk.
Second, it is not the expected act of a customer or other person to remove the rocks
from the landscaping and deposit the rocks on the sidewalk. There is no reason for a person
to move rocks to the sidewalk from the landscaping. In Canfield, the act of removing
lettuce leaves was expected because it was what Albertsons wanted the customer to do.
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There is no reason for ZZXYZ to want customers or others to remove rocks from the
landscaping. ZZXYZ did nothing to encourage customers or others to remove rocks from
the landscaping. ZZXYZ cannot be said to have expected rocks to have been removed from
the landscaping and deposited on the sidewalk.
Third, as it was not an expectable act of third parties to remove rocks from the
landscaping and drop them on the sidewalk, it cannot now be claimed that it was reasonably
foreseeable that an expectable act would create a dangerous condition. To hold otherwise
would effectively mean that anyone who utilizes rock landscaping is liable to anyone who
falls on a rock near the landscaping in question. This is particularly true where even if Neil
did slip on a rock, there is nothing to connect the rock to the landscaping other than the
vicinity.
The Hones also try to claim that an inherent danger was established by failing to
inspect the sidewalks for items such as rocks that might create a danger since ZZXYZ was
aware that there might be things which might be of harm on the sidewalk. (Hones Brief at
21). An inherent danger cannot be established by a failure to inspect. ZZXYZ was aware
that items on the sidewalk could constitute a danger and had a policy of managers
inspecting the sidewalks as they came on shift. This inspection is meant to reveal existing
dangerous conditions. Any failure to inspect would not create the condition or somehow
cause the condition to become more dangerous, because the condition would have either
existed at the time of the inspection or not have existed. A failure to inspect does not
suddenly cause dangerous conditions to be created.
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The Hones rely on the statement by Ryan McMillan, the manager on duty at the time
of the accident, that he does not remember whether or not he performed the customary
inspection of the premises, including the sidewalk, on the day of the accident. (Hones
Brief at 21). This does not show that ZZXYZ failed to make the inspection, only that Mr.
McMillan does not remember years later at the time of his deposition, whether or not he
performed the inspection that day. (McMillan's Deposition, page 12, lines 12-16; R. 110).
Assuming for the moment that Neil did slip on a rock and that the rock did come
from the rock landscaping, this case is much more like the temporary condition cases
where someone slips on an item that has fallen to the floor by the unexpected act of
another. In Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996), the Utah
Supreme Court dealt with the method of operation theory in the context of a slip and fall in
the deli section of a store. The plaintiff in Schnuphase claimed that it was expected that
customers eat ice cream in the store's deli section and it was foreseeable that ice cream
would fall to the floor causing a danger of slipping and falling. Id. at 479. The Court held
that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of the foreseeabihty of an inherently dangerous
condition. Id. Essentially, the court held there was nothing inherently dangerous in the way
the store was conducting its deli business.
Comparing Schnuphase to the instant case shows that while it is possible that rocks
from the landscaping might on occasion end up on the sidewalk, these incidents are
properly treated as temporary conditions. It is not expected that third parties would place
rocks on the sidewalk. It is not expected that third parties would walk through the rock
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landscaping or otherwise disturb the rocks in such a manner that rocks end up on the
sidewalk. Also, while it might be "foreseeable" that rocks might end up on the sidewalk,
this is not the foreseeable result of an expected act. On such occasions that rocks did end
up on the sidewalk, they are comparable to spilled ice cream, or produce that has fallen to
the floor by the unexpected act of a third party.
B.

ZZXYZ's Rock Landscaping Is Not a Permanent Structure That Would
Cause Temporary Hazards,

The Hones appear to rely on the case of Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538
P.2d 175,177 (Utah 1975), citing Maugeri v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 357 F.2d
202 (3rd Cir. 1996), for the proposition that as a temporary condition, rocks on the
sidewalk can be held to a permanent standard if they are caused by a permanent structure.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the landscaping qualifies as a structure, the Allen
case and the Maugeri case seem to indicate that the structure must be dangerous without an
intervening actor. In Maugeri, the vegetable racks were slanted in such a fashion that
according to the Court in Allen, "it should have been anticipated that leaves would fall on
the floor." Id. at 177. Neither the Maugeri or Allen decision make reference to an
unknown party causing leaves to fall to the floor. Rather, it seems to be assumed that the
leaves on their own fell to the floor.
In order for the Maugeri theory to apply to ZZXYZ, the Hones must provide
evidence that would support the proposition that the design of the landscaping was such that
the rocks would on their own, or at least without the act of some person, end up on the
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sidewalk. The Hones have supplied no evidence which would suggest that the rocks in the
landscaping would be able to move from the landscaping to the sidewalk absent some
intervening act. The only evidence related to this point is the expert report obtained by
ZZXYZ which shows that it was not possible for the rain prior to the accident to dislodge
rocks from the landscaping into the sidewalk. The Hones have not shown any evidence
which would dispute this finding, or that would in any other way indicate that rocks could be
transported from the landscaping to the sidewalk, absent intervention by a third party.
Accordingly, the Hones claim that the landscaping is itself a permanent structure that
creates temporary hazards is not supported by the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, ZZXYZ respectfully requests that this Court affirm the summary
judgment granted by the trial court on the grounds that the Hones have failed to provide
evidence to show that any rocks on the sidewalk at the time of Mr. Hone's fall were the
cause of Mr. Hone's fall and that further investigation will not reveal the cause of the fall,
and accordingly, Mr. Hone's claim fails as a matter of law. Alternatively, ZZXYZ
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the granting of summary judgment on the other
ground that Mr. Hone has failed to identify a theory of breach of duty which is supported by
the evidence provided.
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ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an addendum in included
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PROVO, UTAH - OCTOBER 29,2002
HONORABLE STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE PRESIDING
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Once again on the Motion for Summary

Judgment.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's correct, Your Honor. Scott
Christensen appearing on behalf of defendant.
THE COURT:

It's our motion.

We continued this so there would be an

additional discovery issue on that because of the rain water
and whether or not it could wash the rocks down on the sidewalk
and whether it was caused by a third party, right?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

That's the way I understood it,

Your Honor.
THE COURT:

And you supplied an expert report that

seems to present an undisputed fact that that couldn't have
happened, right?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE COURT:

That's my understanding.

So I guess we're back to Mr. Jeffs and do

you have any facts to dispute that as that theory of the case
is whether or not at least that should be partially ruled upon
as a matter of law that that could not have been caused by a
third party or the rain or, I guess what I'm trying to say is
the design of the landscape.

Do you have any evidence to

dispute that theory?
MR. JEFFS:

That was one possible means by which it

could have caused it.
THE COURT:

I'm just trying to get to the issue here.

We've argued this at least twice I think, haven't we?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

This is the second time.

THE COURT: The second time.

And I don't mean to

disrupt any of your arguments if you'd like to present your
case a different way, that's fine but that seems to be issue,
one issue.
MR. JEFFS:

My point is that counsel is presenting

this argument to the wrong forum.

He should be presenting it

to the trier of the fact and I think if it was presented to the
trier of the fact, the trier of the fact could conclude that
the rain was not the cause.

That doesn't mean that that ends

the case as I've indicated in my memorandum in opposition to
his supplemental memorandum.

That is one possibility, but the

inferences that can be draw THE COURT:

Let's assume we had a trial and this is

the evidence, and at the end of the plaintiff's case, your
case, Mr. Christensen, stands up and asks for a Motion to
Dismiss and claims that the jury shouldn't be able to speculate
because the facts that have been presented at this time, are
undisputed, that there's no evidence contrary to what he's
presented other than what you presented to show —
MR. JEFFS:

On the issue of rain.

THE COURT:

-on the issue of rain.

How would I rule
2

at this point?
MR. JEFFS:

But the issues of whether or not they're

negligent is still before the jury.

The Court could not grant

a directed verdict, could not grant a motion to dismiss at the
end of the plaintiff's case because the evidence that would be
presented as set out in both the affidavits for both
memorandums is that the manager admitted that he had the
responsibility to check the walkways to see if they were clear,
he did not do so.
there.

It's undisputed that there were rocks on

They have a responsibility to maintain that area and

they did not do so and we have seen that since that time,
numerous times when the rocks have been allowed to be on there
that caused the fall.

That's undisputed.

evidence to dispute that.

They don't have any

All they have is they're trying to

present to the Court that this is the only basis on which the
jury could draw an inference of negligence from the conduct of
the parties and that's a factual thing.

That's for a jury

determination, what's those inferences would be drawn.

They're

negligent in maintaining the area and that was the cause of the
fall of Neil Hone and it isn't merely saying that it wasn't
caused by rain and we've got an expert that says the rain
couldn't have done and we've got an engineer that says it
wouldn't have washed it down there.

The jury doesn't have to

believe the expert once he's subjected to cross examination in
the context of a trial.

THE COURT:

Let's put this in a different context.

Let's assume this is a banana peel slip and fall case at
Smith's.
MR. JEFFS:

But that's a different theory because

that's saying that the banana was put there by a person other
than the responsible parties for the area and that was the
first time that they claimed that our theory was that somebody
else had put the rocks on there and I said that isn't our
theory, never has been our theory.

Our theory is they have a

responsibility for maintaining of an area that is their invitee
area for their people that come in there.

They have a

responsibility and the jury can conclude from the evidence that
the plaintiffs shall put on in their case, they can conclude
that they were negligent in that and that that was the cause of
the accident, whether or not they disallow their expert or
disbelieve their expert, whichever side they go.

They still

have to face the issue, the jury has the factual issue of
whether they were negligent in the maintenance of the area and
that that was the cause of the accident and that because of
that, my position is that he just presented it to the wrong
forum.

He's not to presenting it to the trier of the fact.

He's trying to present it as though there is nothing for the
trier of the fact and the affidavits of Mr. and Mrs. Hone and
their son all refute that.
THE COURT:

The law is very clear in this state, you

1 I cannot speculate on proximate cause.

The jury can't speculate

2 ! and guess. There must be some evidence to present of the
j
3 ; negligence of the defendant.
4 }

MR. JEFFS:

And their own manager saying my duty was

I
5 | to do it. I didn't do it that day. My duty was to check that
6 ! area and then the rocks are on the area and the testimony is
I
7 I unrefuted that those small pebbles were on the area and that
8 I that caused his fall.
9 | negligence.
10 J

From that the jury can conclude there is

That's what juries do.

THE COURT:

Well, let's assume that the rocks were on

11 | the sidewalk and let's assume that the banana peel is in the
i
i

12 ! aisle at the store, all right?

Let's assume that it's a

i

13 I failure to maintain the premises in both of those situation by
14 ' not inspecting.

You still have to have evidence that the rocks I

i

|

15 | or the banana peel were the cause of the slip or the injury.

I

j

!

16 I There must be some evidence rather than I fell down in the

j

•

'

|

|

17 | aisle at the store and there was a banana peel there. It must j
i
18 | have been the banana peel, therefore, Smith's failed in their
i

19
20
21
22

|
I
j
|

duty and that was the proximate cause of the accident. It
seems to me to be no different than that. The rocks on the
sidewalk. Let's assume they were there. We've got photographs
and you present evidence. You can't speculate though, can you,

23 | that the rocks were actually, that they slipped on, Paula Hone
24 | nor Neil Hone have testified in any of their depositions that
25 ! they actually saw the rocks and they could have caused the slip

and that they were the reason they slipped, did they?
MR. JEFFS:

He testified that he felt something under

his feet and they went out from under him.

He didn't see it

and she didn't see the rocks but that means the jury has to
draw an inference whether that was the cause or not the cause.
That's not speculation.

That's an inference from the evidence

that is presented and that's what juries do is draw inferences
from the fact.

I see that the banana peel has an entirely

different life because originally they thought my theory was
that somebody else put the rocks on the sidewalk and therefore
their case law says that you have to show that it had been
there time enough for them to correct it, etc.f etc.
not our theory at all.

That is

Our theory at all is their maintenance

of the premises is their duty just as much as if the produce
guy had put the banana on the floor.

If they did it

themselves, it doesn't matter the time whether they became
aware of it or not because their guy did it.
theory is here.

That's what our

Their people had to maintain these premises in

a safe condition and did not do so and I don't think it's
speculation at all for a jury to say, "Well, of course they
didn't go over and say how would they be able to say that this
is the rocks that went out from under his feet when he slammed
forward into the building and onto the ground?"

They have to

draw it from an inference of the fact that they were there and
there's no other explanation for his falling down.

THE COURT:

1

Well, I would agree with you if it was a

2

simple matter of trying to identify a particular rock but I

3

don't believe there's any evidence that the rocks caused the

4

fall.

5

MR. JEFFS:

That's the inference the jury would have

6

to draw.

7 I

because he fell as they were walking and he was at the side of

What did cause the fall then?

Did he just fall

i
8 ! his wife?

If they draw that inference, then they no cause us,

that's true.

9

That's what juries do.

They have to decide

whether the evidence leads them to the inference that it was

10

1 1 J the pebbles on the walkway that caused the fall. Mrs. Hones
says that while he was done there and they were waiting for the

12

13 | ambulance to arrive that she kicked them off there so somebody

14 I

else wouldn't fall of them.

The jury can draw that inference

!

15 | that that's exactly what caused it, that fall and that's why
16 | she kicked them off the walkway so that somebody else wouldn't
17 ! fall.
THE COURT:

18 j

Well, if those are the facts then we get

19

to the issue of whether or not they failed to maintain the

20

premises.

21
22

MR. JEFFS:

Right, and my point is this, that

regardless of what he has presented in his memorandum to
!

23

summary judgment, he is asking the Court to make a decision in j

24

the way (inaudible) specifically what the Supreme Court has on |

25

numerous occasions said the Court can't do.

i
It has to leave

I

that to a jury in a negligence case.
THE COURT:

I'm not sure he's making that argument.

He's asking to look and see if there's facts sufficient to send
it to the jury.

He's claiming there are no facts.

There is no

evidence that the rocks were the cause of the incident and they
weren't put there by the negligent design of the landscaping.
MR. JEFFS:

And my position is that the affidavit of

Neil Hone, the affidavit of THE COURT:

I looked at those affidavits yesterday

MR. JEFFS:

- Paula Hone and the affidavit of their

again.

son, creates that fact situation that precludes summary
judgment.
THE COURT:
at that.

Okay.

Neil Hone's affidavit, let's look

I'm looking at Mr. Christensen's first memorandum.
MR. JEFFS:

The first one?

THE COURT:

Where he cites to the record, Page 2,

Paragraph 5, Neil did notice some pea gravel on the sidewalk on
the south side of the building but did not have any trouble
walking through that area, Page 12, Line 7 through 11 of his
deposition.

After Neil has turned to enter the restaurant he

took a step or two and fell.
what caused him to fall.

Paragraph 8, Neil does not know

Paragraph 9, Neil did not see

anything on the sidewalk that would have caused him to fall.
Deposition, Page 34, Line 14 through 17, "While Neil did some
8

pea gravel on the sidewalk, on the south side of the building,
he did not see anything on the sidewalk on the west side of the
building near the entrance."

And then none of the other

witnesses have ever testified they ever saw anything on the
sidewalk or what caused the fall.
And where is Paula's deposition?

Paula, Paragraph

20, did not notice the very small rocks until after he had
fallen.

Page 16, Line 7 through 8.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Those depositions are attached to

that memorandum too if you need to look at the exact—
THE COURT:

I know.

I guess the problem I'm having

is sending this to a jury and then having them speculate or
guess or infer that it must have been the rocks.

It seems to

me and I keep coming back to the banana peel, if you slip and
fall in a grocery store and there's a banana peel there on the
aisle, you've each got to testify you slipped on the banana
peel or somebody saw me slip on the banana peel or the banana
peel caused the fall but if you slip and fall and then there's
a banana peel there, that doesn't - because they negligently
failed to maintain the store and didn't wipe up the banana
peel, that's only one element, that's only one prong of a
negligence case.

You've still got to have evidence that it

proximately caused the fall.

The only reason it's a banana

peel is it's easy to conceptually visualize but rocks are no
different.

It may be that they negligently maintained the

premisses and it may be that they negligently failed to sweep
up the rocks but did the rocks cause the fall?
problem I'm having with the case.

That's the

Maybe I'm off base.

Maybe

I'm kicking a dead dog here.
MR. JEFFS:

My concern with that, Your Honor, is that

when you get to the issue of proximate cause, I know of no
decisions of the Supreme Court where they said a court could
decide proximate cause on a summary judgment motion.

That is a

jury decision.
THE COURT:

Oh, I don't think so.

case law to that effect.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I think there's

You cannot send the issue —
Proximate cause is exactly an

element that must be —
THE COURT:

You cannot speculate on proximate cause.

MR. JEFFS:

And I don't think they have to speculate

but I think they can draw the inferences from the evidence as
it presented by the witnesses and based on those inferences,
they make the decision whether it was proximate cause in every j
case.

I
THE COURT:

Mr. Christensen, what would you like to

j

say?

j
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE COURT:

Well, Your Honor-

I'm trying to get to the issues here and

I don't mean to dismiss any of your arguments.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I understand that and I guess my

J
i
i

!

10 i

1 i biggest concern is is that at the first motion and again here
2

today, Counsel for the Hones has repeatedly indicated that they

3 | are not asserting that these rocks were placed there by third
4

parties.

Then the only other option available as I understand

5 j it under Utah law, is that those rocks were there because it
6 j was a dangerous condition created by the property owner so that
7 i we - and their first theory, in fact what they were saying as I
8 | understand the first one was that they said, No, we're not
9 | claiming that these rocks were placed there by some third
10 i party.

We're saying that there was a design defect in the

11 ! landscape features of this that allowed these rocks to be
12 I washed upon the sidewalk in the area where this happened by the
13 j weather conditions that existed at the time of the accident.
14 | So, in either theory —
15 j

THE COURT:

That's your theory, isn't it, Mr. Jeffs?

16 |

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

17 j

THE COURT:

That's what he presented to us.

Why is this difficult for me to

i

18 I understand?
i

I

19 i
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Then I don't get it because those
20 j rocks didn't appear there magically, they didn't grow there.
21 | There has to be some mechanism why those rocks were there on
22 | the sidewalk.
23 |

THE COURT:

It's not like a banana peel case where

j

24 | somebody drops the banana peel.
25 i right.

Rocks were washed there,

Is that your theory?
11

wmmmBmammsgsmmBBP^

MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE COURT:

They were either washed there-

Or what?

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

That's my problem and the only

thing he presented was he said no, no, no, that's not my
theory.

My theory is not that some third person, some child

came there and was playing in the rocks and as he came into the
restaurant he dropped them, you know.

This was the result of,

if you'll remember he described how the entrance was dug into a
bench there off on the side of the road.
THE COURT:

Which caused us to continue to the case

to allow for further discovery.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

That's why I went to the expense of

getting an engineer there to put it on the compass, to shoot
the slopes, to evaluate the weather records to say this
couldn't happen.

So that takes us back to the point where

okay, those rocks were not washed onto there because of the
design aspects of the landscape, then where did the rocks come
from?

I mean that, to me, that precedes the question of okay,

should we have seen them, what is—
THE COURT:

We do have evidence, at least evidence to

go to the jury that Paula Hone and Neil Hone saw the rocks.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

That Paula Hone saw rocks on the

sidewalk after her husband fell.
THE COURT: Right.

Now that's evidence you have to

live with and that goes to the jury.
12

1 I

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Certainly.

There's a factual

2 I dispute about that that the manager that came out and the
3 I witnesses that come onto the scene immediately afterwards said
4 I they looked and they didn't see anything.

So whether or not

5 | there were rocks there is certainly a factual dispute.
6 I contesting that.

I'm not

What I'm saying is that those rocks didn't

7 | grow there and if you're using the theory that these rocks were
8 | placed there by some outside agency then we fit back into that
9

other argument that says alright, if that's the case, before

10 I the jury can ever evaluate the conduct of the property owner in
11 | their maintenance, you have to know how long it was there.

In

12 i other words, if it was there for four days, then certainly it's
13 i an easy issue for the jury to find.

If it was there for five

14 | minutes then it doesn't matter how poor or how irregular their
15 | maintenance program was because if it was just there for five
16 I minutes then that's not a reasonable period of time as a matter
17 ! of law for them to observe it and remedy it.
18 |

THE COURT:

That goes to the issue of whether or not

19 | it was a dangerous condition that they failed to maintain.
20 |

MR. CHRISTENSEN: That's right.

21 |

THE COURT: That's only one prong of the-

22 |

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Exactly.

But the point is, is that

23 j I still can't decipher and maybe it's my own thick headedness
24 I but I still can't figure out where they're claiming the rocks
25 ! came from because that's a critical element because if it came
13

mmmm

from the landscape features there on the restaurant, then

j

there's got to be some theory of mechanism, they've got to

j

present some evidence to the jury that said these rocks got

j

from point A to point B in order to allow them to, even under

j

their argument today, for the jury to draw some inference that
that was the cause of his accident.
THE COURT:

I

I'm not quite as troubled by that because |

it appears to me there are factual - she sees the rocks on the j
sidewalk.

j
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

There's question about that.

|

There's no question about that and I'm happy to deal with that |
but for them to say —
THE COURT:

•

.

j
j
How long they've been there is a factual I

issue that goes to whether or not it was a failure to maintain i
a safe condition.

j
j

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Right, and my understanding is that i

if it is a dangerous condition, as I understand the law, if it !
i

is a hazardous condition created by the property owner, then
that last element is not a factor.

|

If we created the dangerous

condition, if in other words we thought ic would be clever to

I

have gravel strewn on the sidewalks simply to add to the

!

atmosphere of a Mexican restaurant and people slip on the

\

gravel, absolutely we are clearly at fault if the jury thinks
that's unreasonable, or if that's an unreasonably dangerous
condition.

j

No question about that but in this case, they've
14 i

1 ! got to point to something about the condition, about the
|

i landscape, the sidewalk, the features there that created that
2 !
i dangerous condition that put those rocks there for it to be our
I
3
responsibility, so that you don't have to worrying about the
4
5

timing element and my understanding was simply that their

6

theory was is that given the layout of the landscaping, that it

7

allowed for that gravel to wash onto there.

8

that.

9

whether or not it was factually supported but it made sense

10

when Mr. Jeffs presented that argument at the last hearing.

Now I understand

It made perfect sense even though I disagreed with

THE COURT:

11

Isn't the more pointed question, is how

12 i long the rocks had been there?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

13

You alluded -

Absolutely.

I agree with that.

I

!

14

THE COURT:

!

i
i

15 J

And isn't that established through

testimony of employees and maintenance people and those that

i had the responsibility to daily makes rounds and inspect the

16 |

17

premises?

I

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

18 |
19 j

And his only comment was is he

doesn't recall whether he did it or not, not that he didn't do
!
i

20

it.

21

matter is, is that the only way that can be placed in any kind !

22

of a context is if you know how long the rocks were there.

23

That's my point.

24
25

There's no testimony to that effect but the fact of the

THE COURT:

|

I don't have any trouble holding the

plaintiffs to the burden of proof to have to prove or present
15

mmmmmmmmm
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evidence as to the length of time that the rocks were there.

j

It seems to me their duty is simply to establish whether or not I
I
the premises were maintained in a safe condition.
j
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Then aren't you asking the jury to I

speculate the same way as you're concerned about proximate

j

cause to say we don't know how long it was there.

j

there for two minutes, they weren't negligent.
for five hours it was negligent.
question?

If it was

If it was there!

How's the jury to answer that)

That's their burden of proof.

That's clearly their j

burden of proof under the law because at this point they can't j
point to anything that would implicate Chevy's as placing thosej
rocks there, nothing about the physical layout of the store or |
the restaurant that would allow those rocks to be placed there
!

and if you remember, there's this cleavage point in case law in!
j

these slip and fall cases.

The one set of cases clearly

defines when they're placed there from an outside agency.

|
The

second one is when they are created by the property owner and

j

if they were able to establish that those rocks had in fact

j

I

washed onto there when it rained, then you're absolutely right, j
They don't have any burden to prove how long they were there

j

because it doesn't matter how long they were there, the cause

j

of it was our fault.

So that's why there's this elimination of;

any need to show the timing of it.

So my biggest concern is

j
i

I'm not sure what horse they're riding, what theory they're

j

presenting in this case.

j
i

16:

1 I

Now, Mr. Jeffs has said on two occasions it is the

2 | fact that they're not claiming it was a third person and I
3 I think that's clearly because they recognize they cannot meet
4 j the burden of proof under that theory.

There's nothing about

5 | their rocks that will allow them to establish how long these
6 j rocks were there so they can't meet their necessary
i

7 ! requirements under third party and so they're pointing only to
8 | it and saying, "Well, then this is a dangerous condition that
9

was created by you."

10

rocks.

Well, the dangerous condition is the

If they could establish that those rocks were there

11 I because of us, not that we failed to discover it, that gets
i

i

12 |
i
13 |
i
14 |
15 I

back into the other theory, but those rocks were there because
of us, our employees placing the rocks there, our landscape
pushing the rocks there, something about us that created that,
then you're absolutely right, it's not an issue of timing but

i

i

!

!

16 ! the Court and counsel have failed to get, to focus on the point j
17 j of how did those rocks get there. Once you know that, then you
18 ! know which theory we can go with and until then, I feel like
19 I I'm sort adrift in trying to respond to, you know, smoke and

j

!

i

20 I mirrors because if the rocks were there by us, then I've got to
21 | be able to evaluate that, to be able to discuss it with my
22 j client, to be able to have someone come take a look at it and
23 j say, was there something about the property that 24 |
25 ! that?

THE COURT:

How is the plaintiff suppose to know

How is an invitee into a restaurant suppose to be able
17

to prove how the condition came to be, existed?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

j

Well, if it weren't rocks, I mean, j

the problem with this case is it's rocks.

If it were an ice

j

cream cone that had fallen, if it were a banana peel that had

!

fallen, if it was a lettuce leaf that had fallen, you know -

j

THE COURT:

How's the plaintiff suppose to prove

whether or not it was a store employee that dropped a banana

|

peel or a customer that was eating a banana and threw the peel j
on the ground?

I mean, that's not -

j
i

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

It's not necessary - well, under

j
j

those circumstances, that's their burden of proof because they j
want pay.

Ultimately that's what we're talking about.

They're!

saying, you were a factor, you caused, you are libel for my
j
damages. Now, nothing unusual in the law about saying then you!
I
have to prove every essential element in order for a jury to
j
tell the defendant that they are obligated to give you
j
compensation for your injuries.

j

Now, is it serendipity that he claims to have slipped j
on rocks rather than an ice cube?

Is that my fault?

Is the

j

I mean, someone has got to prove

\

where those rocks came from in order for anyone, particularly

;

defendant then responsible?

the jury to evaluate whether the defendant was negligent.

Now, j
!

I appreciate the fact that it's very difficult because it's a

!

rock but those are the facts that they've alleged, the
defendant has and in fact we don't believe that there were any I
i

18 I

rocks but as long as they are taking that responsibility, that i
position, that it was rocks that fell, then they have to do one j
or the other.

They either have to establish that it was from

someone else or that there was something about the physical

j
j

layout of the property that allowed those rocks to wash there, i
The particular facts of this case are difficult on the

j

plaintiff and I appreciate that but if you shift that burden to j
the defendant, it is equally difficult for the defendant and

j

our case law imposes that burden on the plaintiff because they j
I
are the ones who are seeking compensation. So —
i
|

THE COURT:

What's your best case that you want me toj
!

read to further explain your argument, the difference between

j
i

whether the condition was caused by the defendant or a third

J

party?

i
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Your Honor.

Let me take a look at my briefs,

j

I think the case law that we cited in our initial !

brief is —

j
THE COURT:

Because in preparing for this hearing

this morning, my main concern was the speculation issue.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE COURT:

j
j

And I thinks that clearly a factor, j

And I want to go back and look at this

j

difference in whether the condition was caused by the defendant |
or a third party.

I'm not quite sure I understand why that

matters.

|
j

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Well, our case law is very clear onj

19 I

that.
THE COURT:
the case law.

I know and that's why I want to look at

What's your best case?

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

May I take just a moment to look

through there because I think there is a fairly recent case THE COURT:

That's not published?

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

No, it is a published decision.

It's one of those that I cited but I think my very best case i
the one that cites to the Court, that says these are the
theories of recovery.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

And it is a temporary, transient,

third party, or it's a dangerous condition created by the
property owner, and then it defines the party's
responsibilities and the duties depending on which theory is
being presented.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: And if you'll just give me just a
moment, I'll—
THE COURT:

Explain to me if you can without looking

at that case, what are the different responsibilities and
duties under the different theories?
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

They start out by stating in

reference to the dangerous condition, temporary transient
condition caused by some third party.

They say a property

owner is not an insurer for the safety of all those that come
on it.

I

So in order for the law to impose an obligation on them |

to compensate people who are injured, it is necessary for them |
j

to establish certain elements.

One of them is that that

dangerous condition, because it is transitory, existed for

j
|

such a length of time that the property owner had a reasonable j
opportunity to discover and remedy the situation.

j

THE COURT: Okay.

i

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Now, the second condition is if it j

is a condition created by the property owner and there's a

I

grocery store one where they were stocking shelves and there

j

was crates and boxes in the aisle and someone slipped and fell I
on that, they said it doesn't matter how long it was there

j

because you put it there.

j

i

Ultimately, you're responsible for

it because you created the dangerous condition.
boxes.

You placed the j

You placed the crates on the floor that was an obstacle!

for the plaintiff and the plaintiff then fell.

So we don't

I
!

care about how long it was there because we know ultimately who I
did it.

Similarly, under the first circumstance, if they had

I

found someone who had thrown the banana peel on the ground,

j

that would be a defendant in the lawsuit.

j

They said you

created this dangerous condition.
THE COURT: And so Mr. Jeffs has told you twice and

I
J
I
this Court that his theory is not that the condition was caused J
by a third party.

So therefore, it's caused by, his theory is i
21

it's caused by the defendants and therefore the time, as you
say, it is not an issue that you created the condition.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
THE COURT:

But what has to be proven then -

What has to be proven?

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

- is that how did the rocks get

there and that the cause of those rocks getting there was
created by us.
THE COURT:

Since there's no evidence to dispute the

fact that you caused the condition by any length of time having
the rocks on the property —
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Doesn't matter how long.

If we

placed the rocks there - see, that's the dangerous condition.
It's not the fact that we did or did not conduct an inspection
of the property.
the condition.

Again, that makes no difference if we created
Does that make sense?

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

If we put the rocks there, whether

or not we ever inspected or some other person that was an
employee that might have had responsibility to correct our own
mistake THE COURT: Doesn't matter.
MR. CHRISTENSEN: - doesn't matter, but ultimately
that boils down to not did we inspect but what did we do to
place those rocks there?

Now, my understanding of the first

argument was the landscape.

We've responded to that.

Is there
22

something else that the plaintiffs can point to that they can
argue to a jury or to this Court that we are responsible for
the dangerous conditions, the rocks being placed on the
sidewalk in the area that the plaintiff alleges to have fallen
on?
THE COURT:

You spent most of your time this morning

on this issues which obviously you feel is your best case, your
best point.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
I've got.

I understand it's the only issue

I mean—
THE COURT:

You still have the proximate cause

argument.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:
first motion.

Certainly, and that was in our

I haven't addressed it because I don't think

they get to that question yet.

Proximate case is a secondary

issue once they can establish that we created the dangerous
condition.
THE COURT:
Okay.

Breach of a duty, right.

Mr. Jeffs, in conclusion, obviously you can

tell, both of you can tell I'm struggling with this case and
I've looked at it a couple of times.
MR. JEFFS:

Mr. Christensen keeps wanting to

formulate my theories for me but I won't allow him to do that.
We have never, ever suggested that a third person put those
rocks there.

That theory, that first theory that he's just

23

discussed with you has never been part of this case.

The

j

conditions that were created by the defendant in this case, if
you look at the pictures that we attached and the affidavits of j
Paula Hone, those planted areas right next to where these

j

pebbles were, those planted area have some fairly large rocks

|

in them but interspersed in them are thousands and thousands of I
the very small rocks on which he fell.

j

THE COURT:

Right next to the sidewalk?

MR. JEFFS:

Right next to the sidewalk, yes, in that I

planted area right next to where he fell on the sidewalk.

j

Now, j
i

!

counsel would have me the burden of establishing the precise

j

mechanics by which they got there. The creation of the
j
condition has always been that they had rocks there that got on I
l

the sidewalk and they didn't take care of them and they still

j

don't care of them to this very day and those rocks, whether
they come out by wind blowing them out of there, whether they

j
j

i

i

come out by them hosing down the sidewalk and the planted areas i
i
and put them on the sidewalk, we don't have to prove that. We j
have to prove that there were rocks there on their thing and

|

that the condition was an unsafe condition at the time Neil

|

Hone fell and let the jury draw their inferences because as the j
j
Court pointed out, it is an impossible burden to say precisely I
!

how this rock was picked up or those group of rocks were picked j
up and put over on the sidewalk.

They were on their sidewalk

j
i

in an area for invitees and it was an unsafe condition that

j
i

i
i

J

24 i

1 J caused the fall and the proximate cause issue is exactly the
2 | same thing is that the jury has to look at that and say yes, we
3 J think that's what caused the fall.

That's what juries do and

4 | we think it's a factual issue and it should not be decided on
5 ! summary judgment.
!

6 !

THE COURT:

7 !

Do you have a case?

8 j

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

9 I our memorandum.

10 I

Thank you.

Yes.

It's referenced in Page 11 of

I think it's the Martin v. Safeway Stores,

Inc.

11 j

THE COURT:

I remember that case.

12 |
I

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

That's the case where I think the

|

13

!

court went to some detail to explain the distinction between

14 | the two theories of slip and fall.
15 |
16 ! filed.

Your Honor, there is also another motion that we
It's in reference to Paula Hone's claim and that one I

17 I think is ready to be addressed and the Court can —
18 !

THE COURT: Go ahead.

Do you want to say something

19 ! about that?
20 |

MR. JEFFS:

I thought we addressed that last time?

21 I

THE COURT:

That's the emotional -

22 I

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

I don't recall whether that ever

23 ! was because we never got to that.
24 |

MR. JEFFS:

We stipulated in open court last time.

25 I

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

That she was dismissed?

25 !

•H

^ H

MR. JEFFS:

Yes.

MR. CHRISTENSEN:

Okay, I'm sorry.

MR. JEFFS:

We did that in Court last time.

THE COURT:

You're right on the ball, Mr. Jeffs.

I'

forgotten that as well, thank you.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

That's a loose end on my part and

if I THE COURT:

Okay, thank you.

I'm going to take a

third look at this case and I apologize to both of you and the
frustration you must be experiencing in trying to get a
decision but it's a complicated issue.
MR. CHRISTENSEN:

It is a difficult case and I

appreciate that but I think the problem is that the rules are
going to impose an extremely difficult burden on someone, your
ruling will and I think that the case law has established who
that burden falls on and we believe it's the plaintiff.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

I'll issue a decision

shortly.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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